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Abstract
This paper considers the role of asymmetric information in a politi-
cal agency theory of autocratic economic policy-making. Within the
context of a static game, we analyze the strategic interaction between
an elite ruling class that sets policy and an imperfectly informed dis-
enfranchised class, who may choose to revolt. We identify the Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), which need not be pure strategies. We
enrich the basic model in an extension that includes two-sided un-
certainty and introduces an additional constraint on the elite’s policy
decision. The extended model features pure strategies in the PBE,
which can include inefficient policy choices and revolution. We char-
acterize the equilibrium strategies in terms of the economy’s level of
development.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers the political economy of economic policy in a non-
democracy. We draw upon the classical theory of democratic political agency
to model the strategic interaction between a dictatorial elite class, who sets
policy to maximize their own utility, and a disenfranchised majority, whose
only political power lies in their ability to revolt. The threat of revolution
constrains the extent to which the elite can predate the economy, much
like the need to stand for re-election mitigates the extent to which elected
politicians can extract rent in the democratic political agency literature
(Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986).
The notion of a “revolution constraint” on autocratic leaders is not new
(Grossman, 1991; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001), but the idea that dicta-
tors are political agents has only recently been introduced. We follow Dorsch
and Maarek (2012) and consider the dictator to be the political agent of the
disenfranchised majority.1 In any agency theory, the presence of information
asymmetries is what allows the agent to deviate from serving the interests
of the principal and extract rent.2 As in Dorsch and Maarek (2012), we
consider a novel informational asymmetry in analyzing autocratic economic
policy-making under the threat of revolution. When there is a bad eco-
nomic outcome, against which the disenfranchised may wish to revolt, the
1Acemoglu et al. (2010) is another example that describes the dictator as a political
agent, but their paper considers the strategic interaction between the elite class and the
military.
2For similar models in a democratic setting, see for example, Coate and Morris (1995),
Persson and Tabellini (2000), Besley (2006), and Yared et al (2012).
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disenfranchised do not know the extent to which the dictator’s economic
policy is responsible. The effect is that the economic return to a revolu-
tionary political transition is uncertain. Thus, the dictator can extract rent
from the economy in excess of what he could under a perfectly informed
revolutionary threat. If there were perfect information and the parameters
of the game were stable, revolution would never be an equilibrium outcome
because policy would be set to satisfy the revolution constraint. With asym-
metric information, however, the elite may rationally violate the constraint
to extract excess rents, at the cost of provoking revolution with a strictly
positive probability.
We follow a series of papers by Daron Acemoglu in modeling the elite’s
choice between raising predatory revenue directly through taxation or indi-
rectly through distortionary regulation to benefit elite producers (Acemoglu,
2006a,b, 2010). Along with Dorsch and Maarek (2012), we suppose that the
indirect method of manipulating factor prices cannot be observed by the
working class, who hold the revolutionary threat. In our model, the distor-
tionary regulation limits the size of non-elite firms, which differentiates our
paper from earlier work, which consider barriers to entry on non-elite firms.
The limit on firm size reduces labor demand and therefore wages, which
allows the elite producers to earn abnormal rents. Modeling distortionary
regulation in this way seems to be a more empirically accurate description
of economic policy in under-developed economies, where the size of firms in
the informal sector is small (Djankov et al., 2002; La Porta and Schliefer,
2008).
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Our paper considers the strategic interaction between the elite and the
disenfranchised working class within the context of a one-period game with
asymmetric information. We suppose that the productive potential of the
economy is decided by nature, but that nature’s choice is known only to
the elites. Should the workers observe a bad economic outcome, they are
not certain if it was nature’s choice or due to an unobservable distortionary
policy. Using a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) solution concept, we
characterize when the equilibrium can feature inefficient policy choices and
revolution.3
As in previous literature, one of the key parameters to shape agents’
strategies in our model is the destructive cost of revolution. When the cost
of revolution is high enough there is a separating equilibrium in which the
elite choose the efficient policy and the workers do not revolt. When the cost
of revolt is low, on the other hand, the revolution constraint is tighter and
the payoff for the elite from distortionary regulation may be higher than that
from the efficient policy. If the cost of revolution is low enough, there may
not be a pure strategy equilibrium. In this case, we identify the set of mixed
strategy equilibria, which we characterize in terms of when revolutions are
more likely to occur.
Due to the difficulty of interpreting mixed strategy equilibria in the con-
text of political institutional change, we extend the basic model to include:
(i) a resource cost associated with regulating the size of firms and (ii) uncer-
tainty among the elite over the cost of revolution. The model’s extensions
3We find the underlying economic dynamics to be more clear in a single-period game
as opposed to the multi-period model found in Dorsch and Maarek (2012).
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allow us to identify pure strategy equilibria for the case in which previously
equilibrium strategies were mixed. Now, we can more fully characterize the
conditions under which choosing inefficient economic institutions and rev-
olutions are pure strategy equilibria. We demonstrate a threshold level of
economic development (productive potential of the firms), above which the
elite choose the efficient method and below which they choose distortionary
regulation.
The nature of the information asymmetry is a compelling feature of our
model. Imperfect information has, of course, been previously introduced
into rationalist models of revolutionary political transitions (Kuran, 1989;
Lohmann, 1994; Ellis and Fender, 2010; Bueno de Mesquita, 2010). This
literature typically concentrates on the collective action problem among the
disenfranchised class, who are imperfectly informed about one another’s
“type”. In these models, revolutions may be triggered by information shocks
which facilitate overcoming the collective action problem. By contrast, we
focus on the (non-democratic) political agency problem between the elite
and the disenfranchised, so the working class is considered as a single player
in a game against the elite class. The nature of the information asymmetry
in the kind of game we focus on is, therefore, considerably different from how
uncertainty has previously been treated in models of revolutionary transi-
tions.
Our paper is organized in the following way. The next section describes
the basic feature of our game-theoretic model, which is presented in its
extensive form in the third section. The fourth section demonstrates the
5
game’s Perfect Bayesian equilibria, which may include mixed strategies. The
fifth section extends the basic model and characterizes the extended game’s
pure strategy equilibria. A final section concludes with some suggestions for
future extensions.
2 Economic Environment
The economic environment is essentially a static version of the model in
Dorsch and Maarek (2012). There is a continuum of risk neutral agents
consisting of a measure L of workers, a measure θh of high-productivity (po-
tential) entrepreneurs, and a measure θm of elites who control the political
institution and can also run firms. It is assumed that L > θm + θh so that
workers are a majority of the population and would set policy if the elite
were not in power.
Workers hired by the non-elite entrepreneurs have constant productivity
of Ah, while those in elite firms have productivity Am. We assume Ah > Am,
so that workers are more productive in firms run by entrepreneurs than in
firms run by members of the elite.4 In addition, each worker inelastically
supplies one unit of labor as long as the wage is above the reservation wage,
which we normalize to zero.
Only workers and the elite are considered to be strategic players in the
game. The elite act as a group to maximize their total payoff. The game
described below will give the payoffs to individual workers. However, since
4This assumption is common in the literature; however, the model can be easily solved
when the productivities are equal.
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all workers are identical, they will make the same choices. Therefore, we
will also think of workers as a single player in the game,a cting to maximize
their total payoff. Notice that this means that we are not considering any
coordination problems facing the workers: if one worker revolts then all
workers revolt and the revolution will be successful.5 The entrepreneurs will
start businesses if possible and hire the profit-maximizing amount of labor.
In the previous literature there is usually an exogenously given maximum
number of workers per entrepreneur. In this paper, we make this the choice
variable for the elite and also the subject of the asymmetric information.
Let λe be the number of workers that can be employed per elite firm. We
will normalize units of labor so that λe = 1. The elite also choose the
maximum number of workers per entrepreneur, λ, which we interpret as
an institutional choice. Rauch (1991), for example, shows that regulation
may cause entrepreneurs to move to the informal sector where firms are
constrained to be smaller. Smaller firms in the informal sector could also
be due to lack of access to resources or public goods. There could also be
institutions that create a cost of entry for middle-class entrepreneurs, or
even bar entry explicitly as in Acemoglu (2010) and Dorsch and Maarek
(2012). Whatever the case, we consider the limit on firm size as a proxy for
these kinds of elite regulation of the private sector.
We assume that the workers have incomplete information about the pos-
sible values of λ that the elite could choose. Specifically, we assume that
there is a maximum possible value of this parameter, λ¯, that is known by the
5Considering an exogenous probability of success, as in Acemoglu et al. (2010) and
Ellis and Fender (2010) among others, would not change the equilibrium properties.
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elite, but not by the workers. This λ¯ can be thought of as describing those
features of an economy that affect the capacity constraint of the non-elite
firms. Loosely speaking, we think of λ¯ as summarizing the level of de-
velopment of the economy, which determines the maximum size of non-elite
firms. The elite can impose additional institutional or regulatory constraints
on firm size by choosing λ < λ¯. The workers are able to infer λ from the
equilibrium wage, but are uncertain about whether firms are small because
the elite have restricted their size or the economic situation cannot support
larger firms.
The payoff to the elite comes from two potential sources. First, they
receive profits from the firms they run. This total profit to the elite is
(Am − w) times the amount of labor hired times the measure of the elite
producing, where w is the wage rate. Elite producers cannot earn a positive
profit if w ≥ Am. If this is the case, then the elite earn a payoff from their
second source, which is their ability to tax wage income. When w ≥ Am,
the elite choose a tax rate 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and their payoff includes the tax
revenue, which is τw times the measure of workers receiving wage w. In
principle the elite could receive a payoff from both sources. However, given
our assumptions, only one of these will be nonzero in a specific situation.
The payoff to a worker when the elite are in power will be their after-tax
wage, (1 − τ)w. The workers can also choose to revolt at a cost of µ per
worker. If workers choose to revolt then, since then are a majority, they will
choose not to limit the size of firms and not to tax wage income. Therefore,
a worker’s payoff is w∗−µ if there is a revolution, where w∗ is the wage that
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would result when λ¯ is the maximum size of firms. This post-revolution
wage is not known to the workers. If the workers revolt then the elite’s
payoff is zero.
Given the assumption of constant marginal products of labor, there are
essentially three different states of the economy, which are characterized by
different values of the equilibrium wage. These states are defined by the
values of λ¯, θm, and θh. One can think of the following characterization of
the states of the economy as describing what will happen in a democracy
with no constraints of firm size.
The first possibility is that the maximum number of workers that can
be hired by the entrepreneurs (both elite and middle-class) is less than the
number of workers. In other words,
λ¯ ≤ L− θ
m
θh
≡ λl. (1)
If this is true then the equilibrium wage is zero. Dorsch and Maarek call
this a “tragedy of development”. Notice that in this case, any choice of λ
by the elite will result in w = 0 and, therefore, there will be no tax revenue
from a wage tax. This will also be the labor market outcome if there is a
revolution and the workers take power. We call this a situation with “low
λ¯” and assume that it occurs with probability ρl.
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The second possibility is that the marginal employer is an elite en-
6Alternatively, ρl can be thought to represent the workers’ prior probability of this case,
i.e. their prior that there is a development tragedy. This state features unemployment
even though it does not appear explicitly in the model because wages are zero.
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trepreneur, i.e. when
λl ≡ L− θ
m
θh
< λ¯ ≤ L
θh
≡ λm. (2)
In this case the equilibrium wage will be Am when there are no additional
constraints. Notice that it is possible that only a fraction of the elite are in
business. All elite firms producing will earn zero profits. So, in this case, the
elite’s payoff comes from a tax on wage income unless they choose to limit
the size of middle-class firms so that the equilibrium wage falls to zero. We
call this a situation with “mid λ¯” and assume that it occurs with probability
ρm (since the equilibrium wage will be A
m in this case).
The final possibility is that all workers can be hired by high-productivity
middle-class entrepreneurs. This will be true if
λm ≡ L
θh
< λ¯. (3)
In this situation, the equilibrium wage will be Ah and there will be no elite
producers. We call this a situation with “high λ¯” and assume that it occurs
with probability ρh.
It will be convenient to consider inequalities (1), (2) and (3) with λ¯
replaced by λ. We will call the resulting values of λ low, mid or high,
respectively. These result in the different possible equilibrium wages as a
function of the choice of λ by the elite. So that if the elite choose low λ then
the equilibrium wage is zero, if they choose mid λ then the wage is Am and
if high λ is chosen then the wage is Ah.
All of the above, which is assumed to be common knowledge to workers
and the elite, defines an extensive form game with incomplete information.
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This extensive form is described in the next section along with the notation
describing the behavioral strategies of the players.
3 Extensive Form of the Game
First, nature chooses the value of λ¯, which is observed by the elite but not
the workers, with a probability density given by ρ(λ¯). So the probabilities,
ρl, ρm, and ρh, defined in the previous section are given by
ρl =
∫ λl
0
ρ(λ)dλ,
ρm =
∫ λm
λl
ρ(λ)dλ, and
ρh =
∫ ∞
λm
ρ(λ)dλ.
(4)
Then we let E(λ¯) denote the elite’s information set when λ¯ is revealed.
At each such information set the elite choose functions λ and τ , where for
each λ¯, λ(λ¯) ∈ [0, λ¯] and τ(λ¯) ∈ [0, 1]. Note that if the equilibrium wage
is zero, i.e. a low λ is chosen, the latter tax rate could be irrelevant. The
values λ(λ¯) and τ(λ¯) are the choices of an elite who observe the state of the
economy λ¯, i.e. the behavioral strategy of an elite of type λ¯. We usually
suppress the function notation since it will be clear that we are considering
a particular λ¯.
However, we can simplify things since from a payoff and strategic per-
spective, the only thing that matters is if λ¯ is either low, mid or high as
defined by inequalities (1), (2) or (3), respectively, and whether the elite
choose a λ that is low, mid, or high as defined by the appropriately modi-
fied versions of these three inequalities. Therefore, we will use the following
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notation to describe the three different types of information sets the elite
can have.
El = E(λ¯) for all 0 ≤ λ¯ ≤ λl, i.e. λ¯ is low
Em = E(λ¯) for all λl ≤ λ¯ ≤ λm, i.e. λ¯ is mid, and
Eh = E(λ¯) for all λm ≤ λ¯, i.e. λ¯ is high.
(5)
At El, the elite’s only possible choice is to set a low λ. At Em, the elite can
choose either a low λ or a mid λ with a tax rate τ . At Eh, the elite can
choose any of the three types of λ with tax rate for mid λ and high λ. Of
course, a strategy choice by the elite can also consist of a mixed strategy.
The workers do not know λ¯ and do not observe the elite’s choice of λ,
although they can deduce the latter from the equilibrium wage. What they
observe is the equilibrium wage in the economy and the tax rate chosen by
the elite. These two things define the workers’ information sets, which can
be denoted by W (w, τ). If w = 0 then the tax rate is irrelevant and we
would have W (0, τ) ≡ W (0, τ ′) for all τ and τ ′. At each information set,
the workers select a probability of revolting, r(w, τ) ∈ [0, 1]. Since there
are only three different possible equilibrium wages, 0, Am, or Ah, we can
again simplify possible workers’ corresponding information sets. Associated
with each of the three possible wages we denote the workers’ corresponding
information set as Wl, Wm and Wh, respectively. The last two of these in-
formation sets should also be indexed by the observed tax rate, τ . However,
we will find the only tax rates that are consistent with PBE below and so
will not introduce specific notation showing that the workers’ information
sets really also depend on the tax rate. At each information set, workers
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choose the probability of revolting, which will be denoted rl, rm, and rh at
the corresponding information sets. Again, technically these probabilities
should also depend on the tax rate. We will show how they must do so at a
PBE below.
The payoffs of workers and the elite are given by the following. If workers
revolt (r = 1) then the elite receives zero and workers receive the equilibrium
wage that would result with λ¯ minus the cost of revolting µ. This depends on
whether nature has chosen λ¯ to be low, mid or high and is a random variable
from the workers’ point of view. In these three possible cases, a worker’s
payoff when revolting is −µ, Am − µ, or Ah − µ, respectively. When the
workers do not revolt, they receive the after-tax wage, which now depends
on the λ (and tax rate τ) chosen by the elite. This results in payoffs of 0,
(1 − τ)Am, or (1 − τ)Ah, depending on whether the elite have chosen λ to
be low, mid, or high, respectively. When λ is low, the elite’s payoff is their
profit from running firms, Amθm (remember that λe ≡ 1), since there can
be no wage tax revenue. If λ is mid or high then the elite’s payoff is τAmL
or τAhL, respectively, where τ is the chosen tax rate which can be different
in these two cases. Also, notice that when λ is mid then some elite can be
producing. However, any elite producing earns zero profits in this case since
w = Am. So all of the elite’s payoff comes from taxing labor in this case.
The following summarizes the timing of the game, with payoff matrices
given for the penultimate period.
1. Nature chooses λ¯ with probability density ρ.
2. Elite observe λ¯ with general information sets denoted by E(λ¯) or just
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El, Em, or Eh when λ¯ is low, mid, or high, respectively.
3. At each information set, elite choose a maximium firm size 0 ≤ λ ≤ λ¯
and tax rate 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 with the tax rate irrelevent if λ¯ is low.
4. Given the elite’s choice of λ and τ , the equlibrium wage, w, is deter-
mined and all entreprenuers demand a profit-maximizing number of
workes less than or equal to the maximum (λ for non-elite and 1 for
elite).
5. Workers observe the equilibrium wage, w, and any tax rate, τ with
general information sets denoted by W (w, τ) or just Wl, Wm(τ), or
Wh(τ) for the three possible equilibrium wages, 0, A
m, or Ah, respec-
tively.
6. At each information set, workers choose a probability of revolt, 0 ≤
r ≤ 1.
7. The following summarizes the payoffs in the three possible states of
the economy, i.e. λ¯ is low, mid, or high, in terms of the pure strategies
of the elite and workers. Note that the first expression in each cell is
the elite’s payoff and the second is the payoff to a worker. Remember
that the workers do not know λ¯ and so their expected payoff depends
on their beliefs about λ¯ and the strategy choice of the elite.
(a) λ¯ is low:
Workers
Elite
r = 0 r = 1
low λ Amθm, 0 0, −µ
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(b) λ¯ is mid:
Workers
Elite
r = 0 r = 1
low λ Amθm, 0 0, Am − µ
mid λ, τ ′ τ ′AmL, (1− τ ′)Am 0, Am − µ
(c) λ¯ is high:
Workers
Elite
r = 0 r = 1
low λ Amθm, 0 0, Ah − µ
mid λ, τm τmA
mL, (1− τm)Am 0, Ah − µ
high λ, τh τhA
hL, (1− τh)Ah 0, Ah − µ
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of this game also requires spec-
ifying the players’ beliefs about where they are in each information set. In
general, the workers’ beliefs would be given by p(λ¯|w, τ), i.e. a probabil-
ity density of the workers’ beliefs about λ¯ conditional on w and τ . This
would give the workers’ probability density over nodes at their information
set W (w, τ). However, the only payoff-relevant properties of this density are
the probabilities assigned to λ¯ being low, mid and high, which can depend
on the observed wage of either 0, Am, or Ah. So workers’ beliefs can be
represented by three triples of probabilities, pij , where p
i
j is the probability
that workers believe that λ¯ is low (j = l), mid (j = m) or high (j = h)
when they observe that the wage is 0(i = l), Am(i = m), or Ah(i = h). In
addition, for all i we must have pil + p
i
m + p
i
h = 1 with each p
i
j ≥ 0. When
workers observe w = Ah they know that λ¯ must be high and the elite must
have chosen a high λ. Therefore, beliefs must have phh = 1 with p
h
l = p
h
m = 0.
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When workers observe w = Am then they know that λ¯ cannot be low, i.e.
pml = 0 and p
m
m + p
m
h = 1. When workers observe w = 0 then they know
nothing about λ¯ and so there are no additional restrictions of the probability
vector pl ≡ (pll, plm, plh). Technically, these beliefs should also depend on the
tax rate when relevent.
Definition 1 A PBE for this game gives a choice of (actually a probability
distribution over) λ(λ¯) and a tax rate τ(λ¯) (if the chosen λ is not low) at
each elite’s information set, E(λ¯), a choice by the workers of a probability of
revolting, r(w, τ), at each of their information sets, W (w, τ), and workers’
beliefs, p(λ¯|w, τ) at each of their information sets, such that
• at every information set, the given behavioral strategy is a best reply
for that player given that player’s beliefs at that information set and
the strategies of the other player; and
• the beliefs of a player are consistent with Bayes’ rule given the strate-
gies and prior probabilities ρ whenever possible.
4 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
In this section, PBE are found for all possible combinations of values of the
parameters. First we show several properties that a PBE must have.
We start by describing the only possible τ chosen at Eh along with a high
λ that is consistent with a PBE. To do this we first describe the workers’
best replies at an information W (Ah, τ). If workers observe w = Ah then
they know that λ¯ must be high and that the elite have chosen a high λ.
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Therefore, phh = 1 and the workers know that if they revolt they can get a
wage of Ah with no taxes. So the workers’ best reply will be given by:
r(Ah, τ) = 0
r(Ah, τ) ∈ [0, 1]
r(Ah, τ) = 1

⇐

(1− τ)Ah > Ah − µ
(1− τ)Ah = Ah − µ
(1− τ)Ah < Ah − µ

(6)
In other words, when workers observe the high wage they will revolt with
positive probability only if the tax rate τ is greater or equal to µ
Ah
. Note
that if µ > Ah then the workers will never revolt.
This implies that in a PBE if the elite choose a high λ they will also
choose a tax rate of τh ≡ µAh since a higher tax results in a revolt that yields
zero to the elite and lower rates will yield lower revenue. This means that
the only relevant choice in Eh associated with choosing a high λ is to also
choose τh. This yields payoffs to the elite of either 0 if there is a revolt
or τhA
hL = µL if there is no revolt. Worker’s receive a payoff of Ah − µ
whether or not they revolt.
Actually, the workers will never revolt if the elite choose (high λ, τh) at
a PBE. If workers were to revolt with some positive probability (which is a
weakly best reply for them) then the payoff to the elite would be less than µL
when they choose (high λ, τh) at Eh. However, the elite could then achieve
a payoff arbitrarily close to µL by choosing a tax rate slightly less than τh,
which would cause all workers not to revolt. Therefore, there cannot be a
PBE where the elite choose (high λ, τh) at Eh and the workers revolt with
a strictly positive probability at W (Ah, τh). This proves the following.
Proposition 1 At a PBE, if the elite choose high λ at Eh then they also
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choose the tax rate τh ≡ µAh . Furthermore, at such a PBE, when workers
observe a wage equal to Ah they will not revolt, i.e. rh = 0.
Next, we show that the elite will never choose a mid λ when λ¯ is high
at a PBE. Suppose to the contrary that the elite choose mid λ with tax
rate τ at Eh. At W (A
m, τ), workers will revolt with positive probability
if and only if (1 − τ)Am ≤ pmmAm + pmh Ah − µ or τ ≥
µ−(Ah−Am)pmh
Am since
pmh = 1− pmm in this case. This last inequality gives the highest tax rate at
which there will be no revolt. Also note that pmh by Bayes’ Rule depends on
the ρi and the strategies the elite have chosen at Eh and Em. Therefore, the
elite’s highest (conditional) payoff possible when mid λ is selected at Eh is
to also choose τ =
µ−(Ah−Am)pmh
Am . The elite’s payoff by doing this will be at
most
µ−(Ah−Am)pmh
Am A
mL = µL − (Ah − Am)pmh L. Since the elite can attain
a payoff of µL by selecting (high λ, τh) at Eh, they will never select a mid λ
at Eh, which would imply that p
m
h > 0 and result in a payoff less than µL.
Combining this with the earlier result and the fact that a wage of Am
will not occur when λ¯ is high gives
Proposition 2 At a PBE, the probability that the elite choose a (mid λ, τ)
at Eh is zero. Furthermore, this implies that p
m
h = 0 and therefore p
m
m = 1
at all PBE, i.e. when workers observe a wage of Am they must believe that
λ¯ is mid.
This implies that, at W (Am, τ), workers will not revolt if (1 − τ)Am >
Am − µ or τ < µAm . Define τm ≡ µAm , which will be the tax rate if mid λ is
chosen by the elite at Em at a PBE. So we have
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Proposition 3 At a PBE, if the elite choose a mid λ at Em then they will
also choose a tax rate τm ≡ µAm . Furthermore, as above, the workers will
not revolt at W (Am, τm).
Finally, we describe what consistency with Bayes’ Rule implies about the
workers’ beliefs, pl, at Wl. To do this let q
i
j , where i, j ∈ {l,m, h} denote
the probability that the elite choose a λ that is {low, mid, high} [j is l, m,
or h] when they know λ¯ is {low, mid, high} [i is l, m, or h]. The triple qi
describes the elite’s mixed strategy at its information set Ei. Recall that
qll = 1 since when λ¯ is low the elite can only choose a low λ. Then we have
pll =
ρl
ρl + ρmq
m
l + ρhq
h
l
,
plm =
ρmq
m
l
ρl + ρmq
m
l + ρhq
h
l
, and
plh =
ρhq
h
l
ρl + ρmq
m
l + ρhq
h
l
.
(7)
The following gives the PBE for various possible values of the parameters.
There are 3 cases that describe all of the possible sets of parameters (up to
a set of measure zero given by a set of equalities). We also describe the
additional possible PBE that arise at the boundary of each case.
Case 1: θmAm < µL
At El, low λ is the only possible choice for the elite. At Em, choosing (mid
λ, τh) yields a payoff of µL to the elite since the workers know λ¯ is mid if
they observe a wage of Am and will therefore not revolt if the tax rate is
τh. At Eh, the elite choose (high λ, τh) as shown above. Since the elite are
choosing different policies in each state, we have a separating equilibrium
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and the workers know the state by observing the wage. The given policies
make not revolting a best reply in each of the workers’ information sets. So
these policy choices by the elite and the workers not revolting with beliefs
given by pll = p
m
m = p
h
h = 1 is a pure strategy PBE in this case.
Note that this is also a PBE when θmAm = µL. However, in that
case, there could also be mixed strategy PBE where the elite could choose
a low λ with positive probability at any information set since their payoff
is the same. This would require that the workers’ beliefs be different since
if the wage was zero the workers would not know the state. The beliefs at
Wl, which are given by (7) at a PBE would be determined by the mixed
strategy used by the elite and Bayes’ Rule. [It would still be the case that
pmm = p
H
h = 1.] Any mixed strategy that resulted in beliefs for which not
revolting at Wl is a best reply would be part of a PBE.
Case 2: θmAm > µL and µ > ρmA
m + ρhA
h
The second inequality in this case says that the cost of revolting is greater
than the expected wage using the prior probabilities of the different states,
i.e. the probabilities of whether λ¯ is low, mid or high. Note that if the
expected wage was high enough, i.e. greater than θmAm, then this case
would be empty.
With θmAm > µL, the elite will do better by choosing low λ at Em
and Eh if the workers do not revolt at Wl. If the elite choose low λ at
every information set then the workers will always observe a wage of zero.
Therefore, the workers must believe that the probability of a given state is
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just the probability that nature chooses that state, i.e. for all i, pli = ρi.
Given the second inequality involving µ, the workers will therefore never
revolt at Wl. Therefore, we have a PBE where the elite are always choosing
low λ, the workers always observe a wage of zero and never revolt. The beliefs
must be pl = ρ with pm and ph arbitrary since all information sets where
the workers observe a nonzero wage are off the equilibrium path. Actions by
workers at these other information sets must be optimal given the beliefs and
the first constraint on µ guarantees that the elite will not want to deviate
from choosing a low λ. These features define the pure strategy PBE in this
case.
Notice that this is also a PBE when µ = ρmA
m + ρhA
h. However, in
this case, there would also be mixed strategy PBE of the form given in the
next case.
Case 3: θmAm > µL and µ < ρmA
m + ρhA
h
In this case there is no pure strategy PBE as in the previous two cases. To
see this suppose that the workers do not revolt at Wl. Then the elite will
want to choose low λ at every information set. Then the workers’ beliefs
must be pl = ρ and the second constraint on µ implies that the workers will
revolt at Wl so that the elite would receive a payoff of zero. If the workers
are revolting at Wl then the elite can do better by choosing (mid λ, τm) at
Em and (high λ, τh) at Eh, which both yield a payoff of µL to the elite. If
this is the elite’s strategy then the workers will know that λ¯ is low when the
wage is zero and will therefore not want to revolt at Wl. Therefore, there is
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no pure strategy choice at Wl that is part of a Nash equilibrium.
So there must be a PBE with the workers choosing a mixed strategy at
Wl. For this to be true, we must have the expected payoff of revolting being
equal to the expected payoff of not revolting when the workers observe a
wage of zero. In other words, the workers’ beliefs at Wl must be such that
µ = plmA
m + plhA
h.
Using (7) gives
µ =
ρmq
m
l A
m + ρhq
h
l A
h
ρl + ρmq
m
l + ρhq
h
l
or
(Ah − µ)ρhqhl = µρl − (Am − µ)ρmqml . (8)
Note that Am > µ by the first inequality constraint in this case and the
assumption that θm < L.
This equation gives the constraint on the elite’s mixed strategies at Em
and Eh, which are defined by the the probabilities of choosing low λ, q
m
l
and qhl , at these information sets, that make the workers indifferent between
revolting and not revolting at Wl. These probabilities must be such that
the workers’ expected wage under democracy conditional on observing a
zero wage is equal to the cost of revolting. In general, (8) implies that the
elite are choosing mixed strategies when they know λ¯ is mid and when they
know it is high. However, it is also possible that the elite only mix at one
of these information sets.
For example, (8) is satisfied by
qml = 0 and q
h
l =
µρl
(Ah − µ)ρh , (9)
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which says that the elite choose a mid λ at Em and mix between a low λ
with probability qhl and a high λ (with tax rate τh) at Eh.
Alternatively, (8) is also satisfied by
qhl = 0 and q
m
l =
µρl
(Am − µ)ρm , (10)
which says that the elite choose a mid λ at Eh and mix between a low λ
with probability qml and a mid λ (with tax rate τm) at Em.
In order for the above mixed strategies to be optimal at Em and Eh it
must be that a low λ yields the same expected payoff has (mid λ, τm) at
Em and the same expected payoff as (high λ, τh) at Eh. In other words, we
must have
(1− rl)θmAm = τmAmL = µL and (1− rl)θmAm = τhAhL = µL. (11)
Both of these constraints give
rl =
θmAm − µL
θmAm
(12)
as the probability the workers will revolt when they observe a wage of zero.
Notice that, perhaps surprisingly, this probability of a revolt does not de-
pend on the prior probabilities of the various states, ρi. However, these
probabilities do affect whether this case or the previous case, in which there
is no probability of a revolt, occurs. For example, higher ρm or higher ρh,
other things being equal, make this case more likely than the previous case
and therefore can cause a jump in the equilibrium probability of a revolt
from zero to some positive value.
Equations (8) and (12) define mixed strategies for the elite and workers
that are part of a PBE in this case. Substituting a solution to these equations
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into (7) gives the workers’ beliefs at Wl. When the workers observe a mid
λ they know that λ¯ is mid and will not revolt if and only if τ ≤ τh. When
workers observe a high λ they know that λ¯ is high and do not revolt if and
only if τ ≤ τh. Since the elite choose tax rates τh when they choose a mid λ
and τh when they choose a high λ, there will be no revolt when the wage is
above zero. These features define a PBE in this case.
The following summarizes the three possible PBE of the game.
1. When the cost of revolt and the economic return of taxation relative
to elite productivity is high , i.e. θmAm < µL, there is a pure strategy
PBE in which there is no revolution and all elite types choose taxation
if possible.
2. When elite productivity is high relative to the revenue from taxation
(i.e. θmAm > µL) and the cost of revolt is sufficiently high (i.e. µ >
ρmA
m + ρhA
h), there is a pure strategy PBE in which there is no
revolution and all elite choose factor price manipulation.
3. When elite productivity is high relative to the revenue from taxation
(i.e. θmAm > µL) and the cost of revolt is sufficiently low (i.e µ <
ρmA
m + ρhA
h), there are only mixed strategy PBE in which workers
choose to revolt with positive probability of revolution and some elites
choose factor price manipulation with positive probability.
Mixed strategy equilibria are a bit difficult to interpret since it is unclear
what exactly it means for the elite to mix between different limits on firm
size. Another interpretation of the qil given by (8) is that it represents the
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fraction of the elites in Ei choosing a low λ. So, all elites choose a pure
strategy; however, not all of them observing the same type of information
choose the same strategy. For example, qhl is the fraction of all elites ob-
serving a high λ¯ who choose a low λ. The other 1 − qhl of elites observing
a high λ¯ would choose not to restrict firm size. This is also not completely
satisfactory since it is unclear what determines whether an elite observing a
high λ¯ chooses to restrict firm size or not. Similarly, the workers’ probability
of revolt given by (12) is difficult to interpret.
In the next section we add incomplete information about the value of
the cost of revolting, µ, and a cost of regulation. These additional features
will result in pure strategy PBE existing in all cases.
5 Incomplete Information about µ
In this section, we make the cost of revolution, µ, unknown to the elite. This
implies that there is always a probability of revolt, unlike in the previous
model in which the elite can choose a tax rate that makes the probability of
revolt zero. It is also more realistic that the elite do not know the workers’
cost of revolt. Things like the cost and ease of coordination or the extent of
the workers’ distrust of the elite, which can be included in the cost of revolt,
are clearly better known to the workers than to the elite.
Formally, we assume that the elite only know the probability distribution
function,
F (x) ≡
∫ x
0
f(µ)dµ (13)
giving the probability that µ ≤ x. We will assume that F (0) = 0 so that
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µ > 0 with probability one. In addition, we will assume that F (Am) = 1,
which guarantees that elite with mid or high λ¯ will choose a tax rate less
than 1 when they choose not to restrict firm size.
Workers know the value of µ. So, we now have to index the workers’
information sets by µ. Therefore, W (w, τ, µ) now represents an information
set of the workers. At such an information set, the workers will revolt only
if pmA
m + phA
h − µ ≥ (1 − τ)w, where pm and ph give the conditional
probability given w that the workers believe that the equilibrium wage will
be Am or Ah, respectively, after a revolt.
Additionally, we now introduce a cost for the elite of restricting firm
size. Limiting firms to a size below their potential requires more regulation
and costly monitoring. We suppose that the cost is strictly increasing in the
difference between the productive capacity of non-elite firms and the size of
firms that is desired by the elite. That is, the regulatory cost is higher the
more the elite restrict firm size below λ¯. We capture this regulatory cost
of limiting firms to λ when the economy is characterized by λ¯ by a strictly
increasing continuous function c(λ¯−λ). Assume that c(0) = 0 so that if the
elite impose no restriction on firms there is no regulatory cost.
The elite’s payoff is now reduced by the regulatory cost of achieving
their chosen λ. This means that the elite will choose the λ that results in
their desired outcome and has the lowest regulatory cost. Therefore, if λ¯ is
already of the desired type (i.e. low, mid or high) then the elite will chose
λ = λ¯ and incur no cost. If the elite want to limit firm size then they will
pick the highest λ consistent with the desired equilibrium wage. In other
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words, if the elite want to restrict firm size to a low λ they will pick λl and
if they want to restrict to a mid λ they will pick λm.
When the elite are uncertain about the value of µ, Propositions 1-3
do not directly apply. It will no longer be true, as in Propositions 1 and
3, that elite with high λ¯ and mid λ¯ can prevent revolution by choosing a
conciliatory tax rate. However, we demonstrate below that one implication
of these propositions continues to hold. Namely, elites at Ee and EH who
choose not to restrict firm size have the same expected payoff. We also show
that Proposition 2 still holds when the elite are uncertain about the value
of µ and there is a regulatory cost associated with restricting firm size.
First, consider an elite at an Eh. Remember that when the wage is A
h
the workers know that λ¯ is high and therefore ph = 1 at any W (A
h, τ, µ).
This implies that workers revolt at such information sets whenever µ ≤ τAh
and therefore the elite choosing a high λ will face a probability of a revolt of
F (τAh). So at an E(λ¯) with λ¯ high, the elite’s expected payoff of choosing
(λ¯, τ) is [1−F (τAh)]τAh. This means the elite’s maximum expected payoff
when they do not restrict firm size and choose a tax rate of τ is given by
max
τ
[1− F (τAh)]τAhL. (14)
Let τh be the tax rate that solves this problem.
Now consider an elite at an Em and assume that when workers observe a
wage of Am they believe that λ¯ is mid, i.e. pem = 1. [We will show that this is
in fact true.] Therefore, workers will revolt if µ ≤ τAm and the probability
of revolt facing an elite is F (τAm). So such an elite’s maximum expected
payoff when they do not restrict firm size and choose a tax rate of τ is given
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by
max
τ
[1− F (τAm)]τAmL. (15)
Let τm be the tax rate that solves this problem.
Note that problems (14) and (15) are equivalent to the following problem.
Π∗ ≡ Lmax
x
[1− F (x)]x. (16)
This is true because we have assumed that F (Am) = 1. Note that the
function being maximized in (16) is continuous and is zero at both x = 0 and
x = Am. This means that the solution, x∗, to (16) occurs at 0 < x∗ < Am.
Therefore, the solution to (15) will be τm ≡ x∗Am and the solution to (14) will
be τh ≡ x∗Ah .
Therefore, if pmm = 1 then elite at an Em and Eh will have the same
expected payoff, Π∗, if they choose not to restrict firm size. The condition
pmm = 1 will be satisfied if elite with a high λ¯ never select a mid λ. We next
show that this is true as in Proposition 2.
Suppose the elite at Eh choose a mid λ with tax rate τ . In this case,
workers observing a wage of Am will revolt if (1−τ)Am < pmmAm+pmh Ah−µ
or, equivalently if µ < τAm + (Ah − Am)pmh , since pmm + pmh = 1. Therefore
such an elite’s expected payoff is [1 − F (τAm + (Ah − Am)pmh )]τAmL and
their maximum payoff associated with a mid λ is
max
τ
[1− F (τAm + (Ah −Am)pmh )]τAmL. (17)
Note that this has the form
Lmax
x
[1− F (x+ a)]x, (18)
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where a > 0. Since F is increasing, the maximum value of (18) will be less
than the solution to (16). This means that if a positive measure of elite with
a high λ¯ choose a mid λ, so that pmh > 0, then the payoff of an elite at Eh
choosing not to restrict firm size will have a higher expected payoff that an
elite at Eh who chooses a mid λ. So, at a PBE, no elite will choose a mid λ
at an Eh.
Therefore, Proposition 2 holds in our extended model. This also implies
that the previous argument showing that elites with both mid and high λ¯
have the same payoff, Π∗, applies.
One feature of Propositions 1 and 3 that no longer holds is that there is
always a positive probability of revolt in the extended model. Since µ was
common knowledge in the baseline model, the elite could prevent revolution
by choosing a conciliatory tax rate that satisfies the revolution constraint.
When µ is uncertain for the elites, that is not possible. In the extended
model, the payoff-maximizing tax rates are associated with a strictly positive
probability of revolt.
The value Π∗ will be now used to characterize the different types of
PBE. At each PBE each type of worker and elite will choose a pure strategy,
unlike in the previous section where there are only mixed strategy PBE for
certain parameter values. Workers will choose to revolt at W (w, τ, µ) iff
µ < expected wage after a revolt minus (1− τ)w, where the expected wage
depends on the workers’ conditional beliefs about the true value of λ¯. These
conditional beliefs are given by Bayes’ Rule and the elite’s strategy in the
PBE. The elite with a low λ¯ will choose to make no change. The elite at
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E(λ¯) with λ¯ > λl will choose either not to restrict firm size by selecting
λ = λ¯ with tax rates τm if λ¯ is mid or τh if λ¯ is high, or choose to restrict
firm size by selecting λ = λl. The following describes when each of these
strategies is chosen.
Our characterization will also depend on the following function. Define
Π(`) ≡
1− F
 min{`,λm}∫
λl
ρ(λ)Amdλ+
max{`,λm}∫
λm
ρ(λ)Ahdλ

 θmAm
− c(`− λl).
(19)
This function gives the expected payoff of an elite at E(`) choosing to restrict
firms size by selecting λl assuming that all types of elite with λ¯ ≤ ` also
choose λl and all types of elite with λ¯ > ` choose not to restrict firm size. The
argument of the distribution F is the expected wage given the equilibrium
beliefs of workers observing a zero wage when all types of elite with λ¯ ≤ `
choose a low λ. Note that Π(λl) = θ
mAm and Π is a decreasing continuous
function.
Case 1: θmAm ≤ Π∗
At all E(λ¯) with λ¯ ≤ λl, low λ is the only possible choice for the elite. For
the other elite types, this case says that Π∗ is larger than what such elite
would obtain by choosing a low λ. Therefore, at E(λ¯) with λl < λ¯ ≤ λm,
the elite choose (λ¯, τh) and at E(λ¯) with λ¯ > λm, the elite choose (λ¯, τh).
This gives essentially the same kind of PBE as in the case where θmAm <
µL. All elite choose not to restrict firm size and the workers know the state
by observing the state. Here all elite choose λ = λ¯, which need not occur
30
in the previous section since all λ of the same type are payoff equivalent.
Here, the regulatory cost leads to the elite keeping λ¯ unchanged. Another
difference is that in the previous section there was a zero probability of revolt.
Here, except when w = 0, there is a probability of revolt. Furthermore, elite
with mid and high λ¯ get the same expected payoff, Π∗, and face the same
probability of revolt, F (x∗). However, as in the previous section, elite with
mid λ¯ will have a higher tax rate, τm = x
∗/Am, than elite with high λ¯, who
will select a tax rate of τh = x
∗/Ah.
Case 2: Π∗ < θmAm and Π∗ < Π(`) for all ` > λl
The second condition implies that all elite with λ¯ > λl have a higher payoff
if they restrict firm size to λl than if they choose no restrictions on firm
size with the payoff-maximizing tax rate. This is analogous to the second
case in the previous section, where all elite also choose a low λ. However,
in the previous section workers never revolt while here there is a positive
probability of revolt.
Case 3: Π∗ < θmAm and Π∗ ≥ Π(`) for some ` > λl
Since Π is a decreasing continuous function with θmAm = Π(λl) > Π
∗ ≥
Π(`) for some `, there exists a λ∗ > λl such that Π(λ∗) = Π∗. For all types
of elite with λ¯ < λ∗ their payoff when choosing λl is greater than their payoff
from not restricting firm size, which is Π∗. All types of elite with λ¯ > λ∗
have a higher payoff when not restricting firm size than if they choose λl,
which yields less than Π(λ∗) since the regulatory costs of such elites is larger
than for the type with λ¯ = λ∗.
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This case corresponds to the case in the previous section that had no pure
strategy PBE. However, here we have all players choosing pure strategies
at every information set. All types of elite in economies below some level
of development (i.e. λ¯ < λ∗) choose to restrict firm size, while types with
more developed economies choose not to restrict firm size. In effect, from
the point of view of the workers this is like selecting a particular type of
mixed strategy satisfying the analogue of the constraint (8). The λ∗ defines
a fraction of elite with mid λ¯ that restrict firm size. If this fraction is less
than one then all types of elite with high λ¯ do not restrict firm size. The
fraction of types of elite with high λ¯ that restrict firm size is strictly positive
only if the fraction of types of elite with mid λ¯ that restrict firm size is one.
These fractions of these two types of elite restricting firm size determines
the workers’ expected post-revolution wage when they observe a wage of
zero. In equilibrium this expected wage must be such that the probability
of revolt faced by the elite makes the type of elite with λ∗ indifferent between
restricting firm size and not restricting firm size.
6 Conclusion
As in Dorsch and Maarek (2012) we have introduced incomplete informa-
tion into a political economy model of economic policy in a non-democracy.
However, our model differs from that paper and the other previous litera-
ture along several dimensions. Our model is a static two-player game with
incomplete information rather than a repeated game. The uncertainty is
about the potential size of firms (which we interpret as representing the
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level of development or productive potential of the economy) rather than
about the size of an entrepreneurial middle class. In addition, we consider
an extension in which the elite are also uncertain about the cost of revolt to
the workers. Our equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium rather
Markov perfect equilibrium. In our basic model, we show that it is possible
that there are no pure strategy equilibrium in certain situations. Our ex-
tended model with two-sided uncertainty also includes a regulatory cost of
restricting the size of firms. This cost is increasing in the amount by which
firm size is reduced. This enables us to show that a pure strategy PBE al-
ways exists in the extended model. These equilibria have the property that
there exists a level of development such that if the level observed by the
elite is less than this amount then the elite choose distortionary regulation
while if they know the level of development is higher then they choose the
efficient policy.
Since we are thinking of the parameter λ¯ as representing the level of
development of an economy it would be useful to consider a repeated game
where is parameter evolved over time and/or was endogenously determined.
This would allow one to examine how the institution choice of the elite
evolved over time. One can get a rough sense of what might happen in this
situation by examining how the equilibrium changes in our model as the
expectation of the probability distribution ρ increases. This would place
more weight on states of the economy with higher equilibrium wages, which
would increase the expected wage of the workers after a revolution and thus
make revolts more likely. This would make the first case in each of our mod-
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els less likely, other things being equal. Therefore, one would expect to see
more equilibria where the elite choose the efficient policy as the productive
potential of the economy increases. This is similar to our interpretation of
the equilibrium with the threshold level in our extended model. However, it
would be useful to have a more explicit dynamic model with such a results.
Another possible extension that might be interesting is to consider a
game where the middle-class entrepreneurs are also strategic players. This
would make the model similar to Acemoglu (2010) where he has two com-
peting groups of elites, but no workers. One could ask questions like when
and/or whether the middle-class will support the elite against the workers
or support the workers in a revolt against the elite. In the basic model in
this paper, the middle-class would prefer to have restrictions that limit the
wage to Am (or less) since they make no profits when λ is high and the
wage is Ah. So they would seem likely to support the elite to prevent a
revolution when λ¯ is high. However, when λ¯ is low (or mid) the middle-class
would do better under democracy than under the elite with a restriction on
firm size. So, in such cases, it appears that the middle-class might support
the workers against the elite. It would be interesting examine this issue of
coalition formation more precisely in our model.
References
Acemoglu, D. (2006a) Modeling inefficient institutions, in Advances in Eco-
nomic Theory and Econometrics: Proceedings of the 2005 World Congress
of the Econometric Society (Eds.) R. Blundell, W. Newey and T. Persson,
34
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Acemoglu, D. (2006b) A simple model of inefficient institutions, Scandina-
vian Journal of Economics, 108, 515–546.
Acemoglu, D. (2010) Institutions, factor prices and taxation: Virtues of
strong states?, American Economic Review, 100, 115–119.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2001) A theory of political transitions,
American Economic Review, 91, 938–963.
Acemoglu, D., Ticchi, D. and Vindigni, A. (2010) A theory of military dic-
tatorships, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2, 1–42.
Barro, R. (1973) The control of politicians: An economic model, Public
Choice, 14, 19–42.
Besley, T. (2006) Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Gov-
ernment, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bueno de Mesquita, E. (2010) Regime change and revolutionary en-
trepreneurs, American Political Science Review, 104, 446–466.
Coate, S. and Morris, S. (1995) On the form of transfers to special interests,
Journal of Political Economy, 103, 1210–1235.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2002) The
regulation of entry, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1–37.
Dorsch, M. and Maarek, P. (2012) Inefficient predation, information, and
contagious institutional change, Universite´ de Cergy-Pontoise Working
Paper.
35
Ellis, C. and Fender, J. (2010) Information cascades and revolutionary
regime transitions, Economic Journal, 121, 763–792.
Ferejohn, J. (1986) Incumbent performance and electoral control, Public
Choice, 50, 5–25.
Grossman, H. (1991) A general equilibrium model of insurrections, American
Economic Review, 81, 912–921.
Kuran, T. (1989) Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political
revolution, Public Choice, 61, 41–74.
La Porta, R. and Schliefer, A. (2008) The unofficial economy and economic
development, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 9, 275–352.
Lohmann, S. (1994) Information aggregation through costly political action,
American Economic Review, 84, 518–530.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000) Political economics: explaining eco-
nomic policy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Rauch, J. (1991) Modeling the informal sector formally, Journal of Devel-
opment Economics, 35, 33–47.
36
